Fault diagnosis in networked systems has been an extensively studied field in systems engineering. Fault diagnosis generally includes the tasks of fault detection and isolation, and optionally recovery (FDIR). In this paper we further consider the blame assignment problem: given a system trace on which a system failure occurred and an identified set of faulty components, determine which subsets of faulty components are the culprits for the system failure.
INTRODUCTION
A central idea in systems engineering is that complex systems are built by assembling components. Componentbased systems are desirable because they allow independent development of system components by different suppliers, as well as their incremental construction and modification. The down side of component-based development is that no single Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. entity -neither the integrator, nor component suppliershave a complete understanding of component behaviors and possible interactions between them. This incomplete knowledge, in turn, requires us to resort to black-box analysis methods, when only the input-output behavior of a component is specified.
In this work, we are interested in the forensic analysis of a system following the discovered violation of system safety properties. While this problem is common to all safetycritical domains, our immediate motivation comes from the domain of medical devices. In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for assessing safety of medical devices and regulating their use in health care. When a system failure that harms a patient, known as an adverse event occurs, the hospital is required to report it to the FDA-maintained database [8] . Diagnosis of the root cause is crucial for the subsequent recovery and follow-up prevention measures. Such diagnosis requires recording of system executions leading to the failure, as well as methods for the efficient analysis of the recorded data.
There has been a great amount of research following the seminal work of [5] and [16] in the study of fault diagnosis. In this paper, we take a step further and consider the problem of blame assignment for component-based systems. The system model we use is described in Section 4.1. In this framework, the correct system behavior is captured by a system contract. The correct behavior for each component is captured in turn by a component contract.
We assume that no information is available about the internal behavior while only the values into and out of a component can be observed. This is especially true in most medical devices used currently, which has motivated collaborative efforts to bring open-source devices to hospitals [2] . We further assume that only one trace is observed. The technique of rerunning the system under varying conditions to observe more traces has been used in some of the existing diagnosis approaches (e.g., [16, 5, 20] ). However, rerunning may not always be feasible in practice given the time, financial cost or the potential impact on patients [14, 3] .
We make an initial attempt in defining the blame assignment problem with the aforementioned assumptions. Intuitively, blame assignment is one step further than fault diagnosis: assuming the faulty components in the system are identified, the blame assignment problem aims to determine the subsets of the faulty components that are responsible for the observed system failure.
We propose a formal solution to the blame assignment problem. Given only the observed trace, we provide for-malized reasoning rules to determine how the system would behave if a suspected set of components are replaced with correct ones. This yields a reconstructed set of all potential system traces that could happen. On each reconstructed trace in the set, we check whether the system violation disappeared, and make a decision of whether to blame a subset of suspected components accordingly. In this paper, we focus on a conservative policy of casting blame, i.e., we require the system violation to disappear on every reconstructed trace so as to blame a subset of faulty nodes. In such a case, we call the subset a culprit. Based on our formulation, different blame assignment policies can be easily expressed and are discussed in Section 2.
Further investigation of the relations between the identified culprits yields a minimal culprit set. Soundly identifying minimal culprits can make system maintenance costeffective, as it is enough to only replace components in the minimal culprits instead of all faulty components.
The proposed approach is illustrated with a running example described in Section 4. This example is adapted from a typical medical device interoperability scenario [1, 13] .
The paper is organized as follows. We first define the blame assignment problem in Section 2 and discuss related work in Section 3. Then we show the system models used in our approach in Section 4. Our approach is then discussed in Section 5 and Section 6. Finally we conclude with our current work on tool implementation for blame assignment (Section 7) and a discussion in Section 8. A case study based on a medical device interoperability scenario is used throughout the paper to illustrate the approach.
THE BLAME ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
Given an observed trace T r for system S on which a system property ϕS is violated (denoted T r |= ϕS), define F = {A | A is a component in S and T r |= ϕA} (1) to be the set of faulty components for the violation of ϕS, where ϕA is the constraint on component A's behavior. Not all faulty components in F necessarily contribute to the system violation. For example, some components may be faulty but unrelated with a certain system property.
In this paper we focus on identifying the subsets of faulty components F which are the culprits of the violation of system property ϕS. To formally define the notion of a culprit set, we consider a suspected subset A ⊆ F of faulty components. Replacing every component in A with a correct one would result an alternative system S . Let T RA = tr | tr is a trace for S and tr has the same system input as observed on T r} (2) be the set of possible system traces for S when rerunning the system S with the same system input. A formal characterization of T RA is given after Proposition 2 of Section 6. Intuitively, A is a contributory cause [17] for the system property violation if for some tr ∈ T RA, tr |= ϕS, i.e., the violation of system property ϕS disappears on some system traces after replacing the components in A with correct ones.
Let Corr(A) = {tr | tr ∈ T RA and tr |= ϕS}. We define a ratio p : 2
Proposition 1. A subset A ⊆ F of faulty components is a contributory cause for the violation of a system property ϕS on an observed trace T r if and only if p(A) > 0.
For the computation of the value of p(A), explicit enumeration of the sets T RA and Corr(A) can be a choice for small-sized, discrete event systems [4, 19] . As the system complexity increases, the size of the set T RA could grow intractable. Instead of computing the value for p, sampling in the potential trace space to obtain an estimatep of p could be used. Similar techniques have already been used in the work of fault diagnosis [5, 20] .
The ratio p can be viewed as a measure of likelihood for a subset A of faulty components to be the contributory cause. The larger the value, the more likely the components in A contributed to the system property violation.
When assigning blame to components causing system property violation, the ratio p can also reflect different blame assignment policies. If a policy postulates that at least one subset A1 must be blamed, one may choose the subset which maximizes the ratio p:
The calculated or estimated p ratio can also be compared to an empirical value p blame ∈ [0, 1], where the blame is assigned to a subset A only when p(A) > p blame . An aggressive policy would choose a small value of p blame (e.g., 0 for the most aggressive policy) and blame a subset A whenever p(A) > p blame . A conservative policy may choose a much larger threshold p blame in the range [0, 1].
In the wide spectrum from aggressive policies to conservative ones, in this paper, we are interested in the special case where p(A) = 1. It represents the most conservative blame assignment policy with the highest confidence level. Such a subset A of faulty components represent the main contributory cause [17] for the observed system property violation. By using the approach we introduce in this paper, we are able to cast blame on such a subset A with the highest confidence level.
In cases where for two subsets A and A such that p(A ) = p(A) and A is a proper subset of A, A is blamed instead of A. This also indicates a conservative policy where, blaming less is preferred to blaming more. The behaviors of the faulty, but non-blamed, components are not deemed as the main contributory cause for the observed system failure.
We say that a subset A is minimal at a value pc if p(A) = pc and there does not exist a subset A such that A ⊆ A, A = A, and p(A ) = pc. We define a subset A to be a culprit if p(A) = 1. Given a system S and a trace T r such that T r |= ϕS, let F be as defined in (1), then the blame assignment problem is to identify the set
RELATED WORK
Comparison with fault diagnosis. Fault diagnosis [5, 16, 7, 4, 19] in component-based, discrete event systems has been studied in various work in different settings. In these works, a fault is defined as "a physical condition that causes a device, a component or, an element to fail to perform in a required manner [4] ." Faults may cause errors in individual components, which may then propagate through components and lead to system failures. Fault diagnosis gener-ally includes the tasks of fault detection and isolation, and optionally recovery (FDIR). Fault detection aims at determining whether the components contain faults; fault isolation aims at determining the type and location of the faults; whereas fault recovery aims at providing steering feedbacks or remedy actions to the system. Different from the task of fault isolation, the blame assignment problem is to assign blame to components responsible for the system property violation with the highest confidence level. By assuming that fault detection on an observed system trace has been performed and its result is an input to our approach, we focus on identifying the minimal culprits for system property violations. Therefore, one difference of our work from fault isolation is that, the identified culprit sets can be proper subsets of F. This indicates a scenario where not all faulty components should be blamed for the system property violation: some faulty components's behaviors may have been caused by others producing the wrong input, or some may be irrelevant to the system property, though being faulty. In the worst case, our approach gives the set F as the culprit, meaning that the faulty behaviors of all components in F are the main contributory cause for the system property violation.
Use of the ratio p. In this paper, we define the problem using the ratio p that we showed in Section 2. In addition to blame assignment, several existing techniques [4, 20] on fault diagnosis implicitly used such a ratio.
Comparison with the work in [10] . The work of Gössler et al. [10] has been a precursor to ours in attempting to establish the necessary and sufficient causal relationships between components' behaviors and system failure. Our work differs from [10] in the notion of causes and the rules by which traces are reconstructed. The culprits we define in this paper are in fact contributory causes [17] , a characterization of an informal reasoning process. For trace construction, the approach in [10] requires to only change the faulty components' behaviors while keeping non-faulty components' behaviors (input and output) unchanged. This ignores the impact of changing one component's behavior on other components and imposes unnecessary constraints on trace reconstruction. The example in Subsection 8.5 illustrates the undesired limitation from this rule.
In addition, in this paper we provide a complete formalization of using state-of-the-art SAT/SMT solvers for efficient computation of culprits, which are not discussed in [10] . On the other hand, the work in [10] uses state machines as component models, which may lend their approach advantages in expressivity of component behaviors.
Comparison with work of higher order contracts. The work in [9] and [11] in the field of programming languages study should not be confused with ours, despite the same terms used such as contracts and blame. The contracts in their line of work refer to the correct type check of parameters in a function call, and blame is cast on either the caller or the callee. In contrast, the blame assignment problem we try to solve is for component-based systems.
SYSTEM MODEL AND TRACES
In this section, we present the language we use to define a component-based system. We first informally introduce a simple system that we will use as a running example throughout the paper. We then present the formal definitions of a system in Section 4.1, and illustrate the definitions using our example system in Section 4.2.
The system S in Figure 1 consists of three components C, L, and V . Each component has named input ports and output ports, which are typed variables (a through h). The components are connected by two channels, one from port c to port d and the other from port e to port f . Unconnected component ports become the ports for the system S (a, b, g, and h).
Figure 1: Example System
The behavior of each component is specified as a logical constraint on its input/output pairs of values, called its contract. For example, for L, if the the input port d and output port g are of type boolean, then the contract ϕL := g = d requires that L produces the same output as the input.
A system contract is similarly defined on system input ports and output ports. We also refer to a system contract as a system property.
A trace for the system is a map from all ports to their respective observed values. For example,
trace for the system S in Figure 1 .
Formal Definitions
A port x : Tx is a typed variable with name x and type Tx.
A component A is a tuple IA, OA, ϕA where • IA = {i1, . . . , im} is a set of input ports, • OA = {o1, . . . , on} is a set of output ports, and • ϕA, called the contract for the component, is a logical constraint on ports in IA ∪ OA. A system S = A1, . . . , AJ , θ, ϕS is a set of components A1, . . . , AJ connected by a set θ of channels, with a system property ϕS.
A channel for S is a pair of ports (x, y) such that Tx = Ty, x ∈ J j=1 OA j , and y ∈ J j=1 IA j . x is called the source of the channel, and y is called the target of the channel. Intuitively, a channel (x, y) for S connects from the output port x of one component of S to the input port y of another component of S.
The system property ϕS for S is a logical constraint defined on unconnected ports of S. Formally, let I θ = {x | ∃y.(x, y) ∈ θ} and O θ = {y | ∃x.(x, y) ∈ θ}, respectively; then, ϕS is a logical constraint defined on ports in I ∪ O, where I = J j=1 IA j \ O θ , and O = J j=1 OA j \ I θ are the input and output ports of S, respectively.
In this paper we make the following assumptions about system construction. (a) Fan-in connections are not allowed, i.e., it is required that ∀(x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ θ.y1 = y2. (b) The connected system is acyclic. (c) Each component produces one output on each of its output ports in response to inputs on any subset of its input ports. (d) There is no name clash among port names. (e) Channels are reliable. A value passed into a channel will be successfully transmitted out to the connected component. In other words, we only consider traces T r such that T r(x) = T r(y) if (x, y) is a channel. Note that assumption (d) can be removed by qualifying port names with the associated component names, as is common in component-oriented languages.
We take a synchronous view of the system execution, where a set of external events arriving at the input ports of the system elicit outputs by the receiving components, which propagate along the connections within the system until outputs are produced on the output ports of the system, and then the system waits until the next set of external events arrive. Given the assumptions (a)-(c) above, each port will be used in any such reaction once. We can thus record the whole response in a single snapshot as values observed at each port. In this work, we consider contracts that describe component behavior in a single snapshot 1 ; Section 8.2 discusses an extension to temporal contracts that involve multiple snapshots. Thus, to simplify the discussion, we consider a trace to contain a single snapshot, and formally define it as a map from a port name to the value observed at the port within the reaction.
The value at port x on trace T r is denoted T r(x). The expression T r(x) = T r(y) states a fact that the value at port x and port y are the same on trace T r. Given a trace T r, a component A is said to be faulty on T r if T r |= ϕA. A system S is said to have violated the property ϕS on the trace T r if T r |= ϕS.
Lastly we note that the language for component/system constraints description does not have to be limited to propositional logic. The approach can be generalized to logics whose satisfiability relation is decidable and the number of models for any formula is finite.
Medical Device Interoperability Case Study
The system S shown in Figure 1 is adapted from a medical device interoperability scenario described in [1, 13] .
L is a controller which enables and disables a laser scalpel that a surgeon uses to perform chest operation on a patient. V is a controller for the patient ventilator to help keep the oxygen supply of the patient during whole body analgesia.
The system must ensure two properties: (a) the ventilator V is turned on whenever the patient's SpO2 (blood saturation with oxygen) level is below the threshold, and (b) the laser scalpel and the ventilator should not be both turned on.
For property (b), if L and V are both on, then the contact of laser with high concentration of oxygen could cause burn or fire, which is a hazardous situation that must be avoided.
To ensure that violations to properties (a) or (b) do not happen, a coordinator component C is used. The coordinator C reads (a) the patient's SpO2 level and (b) the threshold value for SpO2, from ports a and b respectively. If a < b, then it sends F to the laser scalpel in port c and T to the ventilator in port e, indicating that the laser scalpel should be disabled and the ventilator should be on; otherwise it sends T to c and F to e.
The
Formal definition of the example in Figure 1 . The ports a and b are of type integers in between 0 and 100. Other ports are booleans. The formula for checking port value range is
The system is defined as S := C, L, V, θ, ϕS , where θ = {(c, d), (e, f )}, and
The component C is defined as C := IC , OC , ϕC , where IC := {a, b}, OC := {c, e}, and
The component L is defined as L := IL, OL, ϕL , where IL := {d}, OL := {g}, and
The component V is defined as V := IV , OV , ϕV , where IV := {f }, OV := {h}, and
Finally, the constraint on the channels is defined as
BLAME ASSIGNMENT
In this paper, we focus on blame assignment rather than fault isolation. In blame assignment, we start with the set F of faulty components for the system property violation on a given trace T r, and analyze which subsets of F are the culprits for the system property violation. The set F is determined by the violations of component contracts observed within T r.
The reasoning process for identifying culprits is called trace reconstruction in this paper. That is, if we suspect a subset A ⊆ F to be the culprit, then we analyze how the system would behave should the faulty components in A be replaced with good ones as specified in their respective contracts. Due to the one-trace assumption that the system will not be rerun to obtain more traces for analysis, we perform this analysis based on information from the component contracts. Given an input to a specific component A, A's output will either be the correct values specified in A's contract, or the faulty value as observed on the trace T r, depending on the trace reconstruction rules introduced in this section.
By following the approach, a set T RA of potential system traces will be constructed. We use the definition of the culprit given in Section 2 to determine whether A is a culprit or not.
The result of blame assignment is usually a subset of F which caused the system property violation, whereas not all faulty components are blamed. To illustrate this, consider the trace T r = {a → 92, b → 95, c → T, d → T, e → F, f → F, g → F, h → F } for the system shown in Figure 1 .
By the contracts of the components and the system, it is straightforward to decide that, on trace T r, both C and L are faulty, and a violation to the system property ϕS occurs. In this case, it is intuitive to see that L should not be a culprit for the system violation, since the component C sends L the wrong instruction; even if L is a correct component, it cannot help prevent the violation of the system property.
In the rest of the section, we use the above example and trace T r to illustrate a straightforward process of trace reconstruction and analysis for culprits. In the next section, we show how the blame assignment problem can be solved efficiently.
For the system shown in Figure 1 and trace T r = {a → 92, b → 95, c → T, d → T, e → F, f → F, g → F, h → F }, components C and L are faulty and the system property ϕS is violated. We would like to determine which subsets of F = {C, L} are the culprits for the violation of ϕS, without additional reruns of the system to obtain new traces.
An informal analysis for the component L would proceed as: "even if L were behaving correctly, it could not prevent the system property from being violated since C is producing the wrong output." This analysis uses the implicit assumption that, even if L is replaced with a good one, the faulty component C would misbehave in the same manner as observed, given the same input for component C.
An informal analysis for the component C would proceed as: "the system property violation could have been prevented if component C were behaving correctly by giving {c → F, e → T } as the output." Here, two implicit assumptions are used. First, when a component is replaced with a good one, its output would change to the correct values accordingly. Second, good components will keep correct behaviors in reconstructed traces.
Such implicit assumptions as in the above two examples are the best one can assume about components' behaviors, given the one-trace assumption in our problem definition.
As a first step in providing a formal approach to blame assignment, in this paper we explicitly state the informal assumptions as reasoning rules when one has to answer the question: "How would the system behave if a component is replaced with a good one, assuming that the same input is given to the new system?" For a component A and a suspected subset A ⊆ F of faulty components, the traces reconstruction rules are as follows. (R1) If A ∈ F, then it is deemed as a good component. In the trace reconstruction, if its input is the same, then its output is kept the same as observed. (R2) If A ∈ F but its input has changed to other values than observed, then each of the correct output values corresponding to the changed input should be considered as a possible execution the component could perform. (R3) If A ∈ A ⊆ F, then A is a faulty component that is replaced by a good one. Its behavior is the same as a good component in Rule (R2). (R4) If A ∈ F \ A, i.e., A is faulty but not in the consideration of being suspected, then no matter whether its input has changed or not, its output remains the same as the value on the observed trace. The rationale for Rule (R4) is that, for a faulty component which we do not replace due to the one trace assumption, we know no information on how it is supposed to behave other than as observed on the only available trace. Thus it is assumed that it will keep producing the same faulty value.
An example of using the rules is as follows. Consider the system in Figure 1 , the trace T r = {a → 92, b → 95, c → T, d → T, e → F, f → F, g → F, h → F }, and an analysis session that only L is suspected (though C and L are both faulty on this trace).
We first take the same input {a → 92, b → 95} as observed on the trace T r. Then we consider the component behavior changes according to the topological order of their dataflow.
Since C is faulty but not suspected, the behavior of C is kept as observed on T r, i.e. C keeps producing the values {c → T, e → F } (Rule (R4)). Component V is not faulty, so it will behave correctly as specified in (9) to produce {h → F } (Rule (R1)). Component L is suspected, so it will be replaced and behave as a correct one, producing {g → T } as the output (Rule (R3)).
Therefore, the potential system trace after component L is replaced is the reconstructed trace T r = {a → 92, b → 95, c → T, d → T, e → F, f → F, g → T, h → F }. Thus we obtained a set of possible system behaviors after replacing L, i.e., T R {L} = {T r }.
2 Since on T r the system property is still violated, we have Corr({L}) = ∅, thus p({L}) = 0. By definition in (5), {L} is not a culprit.
By similar reasoning with trace reconstruction rules (R1)-(R4), we have p({C}) = 1 and p({C, L}) = 1, so they are culprits for the system violation. The subset {C} is minimal at ratio 1, therefore Culprit = {{C}}.
In general, given a system S = A1, . . . , AJ , θ, ϕS and a trace T r such that T r |= ϕS, the straightforward blame assignment process is as follows.
1. Compute the set F of faulty components. 2. Let C be an empty set. However, this straightforward computation is time consuming. Indeed, as shown in Theorem 1 in Section 6, an instance of the problem of determining whether A is a culprit is equivalent to an instance of an unsatisfiability checking problem in the logic used to express component contracts, whereas the latter is known to be a problem in the coNPcomplete complexity class even for boolean logic [18] .
On the other hand, also due to the equivalence shown in Theorem 1, we could transform the culprit determination problem into an equivalent unsatisfiability checking problem, for which standard best-effort solutions exist. Stateof-the-art SAT/SMT solvers can be employed for efficient implementations to find culprits. This transformation is discussed in the next section.
TRANSFORMATION INTO AN UNSAT-ISFIABILITY CHECKING PROBLEM
The translation from deciding if A is a culprit to an unsatisfiability checking problem is made possible by the fact that both the conditions and the corresponding constraints on component behaviors in reconstruction rules (R1)-(R4) can be encoded in logical constraints analogous to Equations (6)- (9) .
In this section, we present the transformation, assuming a given system S = A1, . . . , AJ , θ, ϕS , and a given trace T r with T r |= ϕS.
We first construct a series of subformulas used in later definitions (see Section 6.1 for details):
Here, ι is a formula constraining the input to the system be the same as observed on trace T r. η is a formula constraining that the two values on the source and target ports of any channel are the same. ξ A j ,k represents the condition check of Rule (Rk) for component Aj. κA j represents the constraint on component Aj's behavior if it is supposed to keep the output as on the observed trace in the trace reconstruction, i.e., if Rule (R1) or (R4) applies. The corresponding behavior of component Aj if it is non-faulty, or faulty and suspected (thus replaced with a correct one) is the same as its contract ϕA j . Note that these definitions are parametric to the set F of faulty components and the set of suspected components A ⊆ F.
With the defined subformulas, it is then possible to define the behavior of a component in the trace reconstruction:
Informally, this means, if Rule (R1) or (R4) applies, then the component Aj's behavior is constrained by κA j ; otherwise it is constrained by its contract ϕA j .
Proposition 2. The formula
defines the set T RA of all the possible system behaviors with the same input as observed on T r, after suspected components are replaced with correct ones.
Formally, T RA = {tr | tr |= ψ} where ψ is defined in Equation (15) above.
According to the definition of p(A) in Equation (3), for p(A) to be 1, we are left to check that on every trace in T RA the property ϕS is satisfied. This is equivalent to checking that
is unsatisfiable.
Theorem 1. Given a system S = A1, . . . , AJ , θ, ϕS with components A1, . . . , AJ and a system trace T r such that T r |= ϕS. Let F be defined as in (1) and let A ∈ 2 F . Then A is a culprit if and only if the formula ψ ∧ ¬ϕS defined in Equation (16) is unsatisfiable.
Proof. First suppose (16) is unsatisfiable. Then for any trace tr, either (a) tr |= ψ or (b) tr |= ψ but tr |= ¬ϕS.
This means that if trace tr ∈ T RA, then it must be that tr |= ¬ϕS, i.e., tr |= ϕS, i.e., tr ∈ Corr(A). Therefore p(A) = 1, so A is a culprit.
Conversely, suppose A is a culprit, then ∀tr ∈ T RA.tr |= ϕS, so tr |= ¬ϕS, hence tr |= ψ ∧ ¬ϕS. On the other hand, for trace tr ∈ T RA, by the definition of T RA, tr |= ψ, hence tr |= ψ ∧ ¬ϕS. Therefore, for any trace tr, Equation (16) is not satisfied, i.e., (16) is unsatisfiable.
Formula Construction
We now expand the definitions in Equations (11)- (13). The construction is systematic for any system S and trace T r as defined in Section 4.1, and parametric to the set F of faulty components and a non-empty subset A ⊆ F of suspected components.
A constraint that a port x should have the same as observed on trace T r is written as a logical formula
where T rx is the value of x as observed on trace T r.
The constraint ι on system input is defined as
where I is the set of open input ports of system S.
The constraint η on channels is
The test of whether a component Aj is in a set A is a logical disjunction:
For a component Aj, the conditions for Rules (R1)-(R4) can then be defined respectively as follows.
The constraints κA j on the components output if their output values should be the same as observed is defined as:
For each subset A, using the formulas defined in (17)-(25) to replace those used in (14)- (16), we obtain an instance of the unsatisfiability problem. By courtesy of Theorem 1, we can check for the unsatisfiability of the constructed formula instead of explicitly constructing the set T RA and checking system property ϕS on every trace in T RA.
Case Study Continued
Currently we are working on employing the presented approach to perform analyses on the laser scalpel/ventilator interoperability case study, shown in Section 4.2. As an illustration, we show the case for the system trace T r = {a →
suspected set A = {L} which is a subset of F = {C, L} of faulty components.
The logical formulas for the case are constructed according to Equations (18) (23), (24) and (25), respectively. Note that the formula
represents the case that the faulty component C keeps producing the same wrong values, according to Rule (R4).
The constructions for L are
with ξL,3, ξL,4, and κL the same as in Equations (23), (24) and (25), respectively. This is similar for V . Lastly, an instance of the formula ψ∧¬ϕS in Equation (16) is defined. This formula is satisfiable, which, by Theorem 1, means that the set {L} is not a culprit. By similar processes, the sets {C} and {C, L} are culprits. By Definition 5, we have Culprit = {{C}}.
This example shows the difference of blame assignment and fault isolation. In fault isolation, after finding out that L and C are both faulty, the task is to find out what types of faults components L and C may have encountered and where the faults may be located inside the components L and C, respectively. In blame assignment, the task is to identify the minimal subsets of components which have contributed to the system property violation. In the above example, although the component L is faulty, the blame assignment analysis we have performed identifies C as the culprit for the violation, where L has been ruled out.
IMPLEMENTATION
The construction shown in Section 6.2 is a general process, given the system definition and a recorded trace. Existing state-of-the-art SAT/SMT solvers, such as Z3 from Microsoft Research [6] used in this paper, support the encoding of formula objects definitions. With the formulas encoded, a call to the theorem prover to check whether the formula in Equation (16) is satisfiable is issued, and the result is parsed for determining a culprit.
To automate this process, we have implemented a Python utility that employs the Z3 theorem prover to identify the Culprit set defined in (5). The system description and trace are written in two separate XML files and fed to the utility. Component contracts ϕA j and system property ϕS are written as strings that will be parsed into Z3 formula objects.
After reading in and parsing the XML files, the utility (a) computes the set F, (b) constructs the set 2 F , (c) for each (non-empty) A ∈ 2 F , constructs corresponding Z3 formula objects used in (16), (d) calls the Z3 library for unsatisfiability check, (e) records the suspected set if it is a culprit, and finally (f) computes minimal culprits and outputs all the culprits it gathered.
8. DISCUSSION
Relationship Between Component and System Contracts
We assumed in the paper that component and system contracts are logically related to reflect the correct system design. Formally, for a system S = A1, . . . , AJ , θ, ϕS , we require that
where η is the port constraint defined in Equation (19) . That is, by composing components to design the system S, it should be made sure that the system property is not violated for any accepted input. If this requirement does not hold, the analysis in our approach would not proceed as the set F of faulty components can be spurious. This can be illustrated using a slight variation of the case study shown in Subsection 4.2. Everything else being the same, suppose the contract for C had mistakenly included the assignment {a → 92, b → 95, c → T, e → F } as a correct input/output pair. Then on the trace T r = {a → 92, b → 95, c → T, d → T, e → F, f → F, g → F, h → F } in the running case study, C would not even be identified as a faulty component in the first place. The set F of faulty components in this case is just {L}, whereas the blame assignment procedure introduced in our paper gives Culprit = ∅.
This spurious result is due to the violation of the condition in Equation (27). The given trace T r in this case is an assignment for the port variables that falsifies (27).
Extending to Temporal Contracts
For the clarity of presentation, in this paper we have treated a trace as just one snapshot. In general, a system engages in repeated interactions with its environment, and contracts for both the system and individual components can describe relationships between values produced over multiple reactions.
The first complication in handling this general case is that interactions may overlap. For example, if a system is a chain of components, the last component in the chain may still be producing a system output for one reaction, while the first component may have already consumed the next system input, starting the next reaction. Isolating a set of values that belong in a snapshot is in itself a challenging problem and has been studied under the name of trace alignment [12] .
Assuming such alignment is possible, we can represent the trace as a sequence of snapshots. We can then use a specification (for example, using a temporal logic) to describe relationships between values in different snapshots. For our case study, an example of a temporal property may be that whenever an SpO2 reading (port a) is less than the threshold (port b), then the output in port g of the laser scalpel component L must be F three snapshots later. We express this property using the "next snapshot" operator X of the linear temporal logic [15] as a < b ⇒ XXX(g = F ). In this case, a violation will be detected with a delay of three snapshots, once we observe the laser scalpel output. To perform the blame assignment analysis, we can start trace resonstruction three steps in the past from the moment a violation is observed.
In general, however, it is difficult to tell how far in the past the trace reconstruction should extend. In [10] , trace reconstruction starts at the origin of the trace; however the complexity of trace reconstruction grows with the length of the trace. Incremental trace reconstruction may be one possibility to explore.
Dealing with Timed Systems
In this paper contracts of the system/components are specified as relations on input/output pairs. The analysis does not apply to cases where a system failure would consist of timing information of the values in component ports.
In general, modeling time in the proposed approach can be challenging. One has to provide abstractions to represent time in the system. In addition to considering different values a port could produce, one has to consider different times at which the value could be produced. This additional, orthogonal dimension of complication could dramatically increase the space of potential system traces after the replacement of components. The trace reconstruction idea presented in the paper has to be extended to cope with the time domain. This is currently one aspect of our ongoing work.
Scalability
Two aspects affect the scalability of our approach. First, in order to investigate each possible combination of faulty components, we explicitly constructed the power set 2 F for the set F of faulty components for the observed system trace. The scalability of our approach is limited by the number of faulty components, rather than the total number of the components in the system.
Second, unsatisfiability problems for boolean logic are known to be coNP-complete [18] , which imposes an algorithmic upper bound on analyzer capabilities. However, we envision that the scalability of our approach is only limited by the state-of-the-art SAT/SMT solvers being used. This is due to the fact that our transformation of blame assignment problem instances into unsatisfiability checking problem instances only imposes minimal overhead: as seen in Section 6, the number of variables for constructing logical formulas is the same as the total number of different ports of components, and the number of constructed clauses is linear to the number of components in the system.
We are now working with case studies of larger sizes to obtain empirical results on the above two aspects of limitations on the scalability of our approach.
Comparison of Reasoning Rules for Trace Reconstruction
In this subsection, we present a slightly revised version of the laser scalpel and ventilator interoperability case study which demonstrates the difference between our approach and the work presented in [10] .
In summary, the approach used in [10] to trace reconstruction requires that all non-faulty components' behaviors be kept unchanged in the reconstruction. This effectively rules out traces where the input to non-faulty components has been changed. To accommodate the loss of reconstructed traces, the approach in [10] uses a different reasoning rule for assigning blame, that is, as we interpret, the suspected local component is blamed if and only if this test succeeds: in every possible reconstructed trace where non-faulty components' behaviors are kept unchanged, if the violation on the suspected local component disappears, then the system property violation must also disappear.
This trace reconstruction and reasoning rule is equivalent to ours with only one exception, which happens when there are good components lying downstream in the topological order according to data flow. The omission of certain traces in this approach could lead to spurious analysis results as we illustrate using the system S1 in Figure 2 . In addition to the system in Figure 1 , two components L1 and V1 are added, whose behaviors are analogous to those of L and V , i.e., forwarding the received messages. However, the system property is now changed to (28) i.e., the output l of the lower branch of the system is not related to system property at all. (Note: This is a contrived system property, but it does illustrate the point.) In this case, on the trace T r = {a → 98, b → 95, c → T, d → T, e → F, f → F, g → F, h → T, i → F, j → T, k → F, l → T }, the components L and V are faulty, and the global system property ϕS 1 is violated.
When analyzing whether the subset {V } is a culprit, the trace reconstruction using the approach in [10] is limited by the output of C and the input of V1 on the observed trace, where {e → F, j → T }. This means on any possible reconstructed trace, it must be that {f → F, h → T }, where V 's violation does not disappear. Thus, the precondition of the test rule in [10] for culprit is vacuously false, which makes the test for culprit vacuously succeed. Therefore V is blamed in this case.
This result is apparently spurious, since the system property ϕS 1 has nothing to do with the component V (and V1) by construction. In this case, an analysis engine should not ever cast blame on any subset of {V, V1}.
As a comparison, our approach considers what the resulting traces would be should the faulty components be replaced with good ones. According to our analysis, the subsets {L} and {L, V } are culprits, while Culprit = {{L}}.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed the blame assignment problem under the assumption that only one system trace is available. We showed that our presented approach casts blame on faulty components for the system property violation in a conservative yet high-confident manner.
The problem that we defined is equivalent to an unsatisfiability checking problem, for which state-of-the-art theorem provers exist. The theorem provers can be utilized for an efficient blame assignment engine implementation. Based on our Python utility which automates the processes of translating blame assignment instances and analyzing for culprits, larger-sized case studies will be studied for us to gain empirical results on the scaleability of our approach.
